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N Richey v. Stop N Go Markets I the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a landlord who assigns his interest in the demised premises
retains a previously existing cause of action against the tenant. In
Richey the landlord leased two convenience store sites to the tenant under
twenty-year leases. Both leases required that the tenant obtain the written
consent of the landlord prior to making any structural alterations or mate-
rial changes to the leased premises. Pursuant to the leases the landlord
installed a walk-in cooler in each store.
The tenant in Richey closed the convenience stores when they proved
unprofitable, but continued to pay rent and to seek subtenants. After find-
ing a subtenant for each store the tenant removed the walk-in coolers from
the premises. The tenant had requested the landlord's consent to such re-
moval, at least with respect to one of the coolers, but the landlord had
failed to respond to the request. The landlord filed suit to recover dam-
ages arising from the removal of the coolers. After the commencement of
the litigation the landlord sold both sites to a third party. The transfer
instruments did not contain an express assignment or reservation of the
outstanding cause of action against the tenant.2
In rendering a judgment for the tenant, the trial court found that the
removal of the walk-in coolers enhanced the value of the stores and that
the alterations were necessary to the subletting of the stores.3 The trial
court also found that the tenant had not breached the lease agreements
because the landlord had unreasonably withheld consent to the changes.4
The trial court concluded that the landlord could not maintain the suit, on
the ground that he failed to prove the removal of the coolers caused him
any damage. 5 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding based
on a finding that the landlord had no standing to sue the tenant for his own
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1. 654 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983).
2. The landlord transferred the property "together with all and singular the rights and
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benefit subsequent to the landlord's sale of his interest in the property.6
The Texas Supreme Court held that both the trial court and the court of
appeals failed to distinguish between two separate issues concerning the
landlord's cause of action.7 The first issue, the court stated, was whether
the landlord could maintain his cause of action after he sold the property.
The second element was whether the landlord had proved that the tenant's
wrongful act had caused him injury.
On the issue of the landlord's right to maintain the action subsequent to
the conveyance the tenant argued that the landlord's action for breach of
the lease was not personal, but was transferred with the property. The
tenant based this argument on section 16.2(3) of the Restatement (Second)
of Property, Landlord and Tenant. That section provides:
The benefit of an express promissory obligation under the lease runs
with the transfer of an interest in the leased property if:
(a) the promise touches and concerns the transferred interest;
(b) the promisor and promisee intend that the benefit is to run
with the transferred interest;
(c) the transferor does not withhold the benefit of the promise
from the transferee; and
(d) the transferor brings the transferee into privity of estate with
the person obligated to perform the promise.8
In essence, the tenant asserted that his obligation to return the leased
premises in as good a condition as when he received them was a covenant
running with the land. The supreme court, however, held that section
16.2(3) was not applicable since it dealt with the transfer of a tenant's obli-
gations under a lease from the landlord to a transferee, while the question
in Richey was which landlord could sue the tenant for damages resulting
from a breach by the tenant.9 Whether a landlord who sells the leased
premises subsequent to the accrual of a cause of action against the tenant
retains that cause of action is an entirely separate question.' 0 Relying on
authority from other jurisdictions, the supreme court held that, in the ab-
sence of an express assignment of the cause of action, the original landlord
retains the right to recover for a tenant's breach of the lease occurring
prior to a conveyance of the property."l The court's rationale was simply
6. Richey v. Stop N Go Mkts., 643 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1982), afl'd, 654 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983).
7. 654 S.W.2d at 431. The court stated that the lower courts apparently reasoned that
because the landlord failed to prove that the tenant's removal of the coolers had caused him
any damage, he lost his capacity to maintain the cause of action. Id.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.2(3) (1977),
cited in Richey, 654 S.W.2d at 432.
9. 654 S.W.2d at 432.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Cote v. A.J. Bayless Mkts., Inc., 128 Ariz. 438, 626 P.2d 602 (Ct. App.
1981); Berman v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 168 Colo. 332, 451 P.2d 742 (1969); Michael v. Mitchell,
118 Ind. App. 18, 73 N.E.2d 363 (1947); Bailey v. Meade, 250 Mass. 46, 144 N.E. 110 (1924);
First Nat'l Bank v. Kavorinos, 364 Mo. 947, 270 S.W.2d 23 (1954); Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 25
N.J. 503, 138 A.2d 18 (1958); Guidetti v. Moroze, 102 Misc. 2d 158, 423 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Al-
bany County Ct. 1979); Wallace v. Paulus Bros. Packing Co., 191 Or. 564, 231 P.2d 417
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that the owner at the time of the breach, not a subsequent owner, is the one
who actually suffers the damage resulting from the breach.' 2 Although the
supreme court held that the landlord had retained his cause of action
against the tenant, the court affirmed the court of appeals holding because
the landlord failed to prove that the tenant's removal of the coolers had
caused him any injury. 13
B. Constructive Eviction
In Briargrove Shopping Center Joint Venture v. Vilar, Inc. 14 the Houston
court of appeals considered whether a landlord's three-month interference
with a tenant's parking area constituted a permanent deprivation of use of
the premises within the definition of constructive eviction. 15 In Briargrove
the landlord leased a warehouse at the back of the Briargrove Shopping
Center to the tenant for use as a automobile repair shop. The tenant used
the vacant concrete area in front of the warehouse to store cars, although
this area was not part of the leased premises. The parties did not discuss
any restrictions concerning the tenant's use of the parking area, although
.the tenant agreed not to work on cars on the parking area outside the shop.
The tenant testified that the profitable operation of his business required
the use of the vacant concrete area for parking space and for the storage of
automobiles. The lease contained a provision guaranteeing that the park-
ing area would not decrease in size during the term of the lease. 16
After the lease had been in effect for approximately a year, the landlord
commenced construction of a theatre. The construction consumed all but
ten feet of the concrete area in front of the shop and substantially inter-
fered with the tenant's customer and employee access to the shop. During
the construction of the theatre, the tenant received many complaints from
customers concerning the inconvenience caused by the construction. Ad-
ditionally, the shortage of parking space forced the tenant to store cars a
substantially greater distance from his shop. 17 Approximately three
months after construction of the theatre commenced, the tenant moved to
(1951); Barber v. Watch Hill Fire Dist., 36 R.I. 236, 89 A. 1056 (1914); 3 M. FRIEDMAN,
FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 36.2 (1978); R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 8.4 (1980)).
12. 654 S.W.2d at 432.
13. Id.
14. 647 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1982, no writ).
15. The trial court, in its charge to the jury, defined constructive eviction to comprise
four distinct elements: First, an intention by the landlord that the tenant no longer enjoy the
premises; second, a material act by the landlord substantially interfering with the tenant's
use and enjoyment of the premises for the purposes for which they are let; third, an act that
permanently deprives the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the premises; and fourth, an
abandonment of the premises by the tenant within a reasonable time after the commission of
the act. Id. at 334.
16. The lease provided that "'said parking area or areas shall at all times be equal or
equivalent . . .' to the area indicated on an attached exhibit." Id. at 332 (emphasis supplied
by court).
17. The lack of available parking space forced the tenant to park cars in an area 300-
400 feet from his shop. Due to the construction, the only available entrance consisted of a
muddy shell driveway.
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another location. The landlord then sued the tenant for breach of the
lease. The tenant cross-claimed, alleging that the construction of the
threatre constituted a constructive eviction.
The trial court held that the landlord's interference with the tenant's use
of the concrete area constituted a constructive eviction.' 8 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's determination.' 9 In considering the con-
structive eviction claim, the court of appeals noted that neither party
presented testimony indicating whether parking for the shop would be
available after the completion of the construction of the theatre.20 In the
absence of such evidence, the court limited its decision to whether the
three months of construction was sufficient to constitute a permanent dep-
rivation. 21 Relying on its earlier decision in Richker v. Georgardis,22 the
court concluded that the three-month loss of use of the parking area con-
stituted a permanent deprivation. 23 The court concluded that since com-
mon knowledge dictated that the construction of the theatre would last for
several more months, the tenant's subjection to the continued interference
with the leased property by the landlord constituted a permanent depriva-
tion, and thus a constructive eviction in light of the court's holding in
Richker.24
C Late Payments
In Giller Industries, Inc. v. Hartley25 the Dallas court of appeals con-
strued a common lease provision stating that the landlord's waiver of a
default or breach by the tenant does not constitute a waiver as to future
defaults or breaches. In Giller the landlord and tenant entered into a
three-year lease containing such a provision.26 The lease required pay-
ment of rental installments on the first day of each calendar month. The
tenant paid the first installment timely but failed to pay the following six
installments punctually. When the tenant tendered the eighth installment
fourteen days after it was due, the landlord refused the tender and de-
manded immediate possession of the leased premises. The tenant vacated
the property the following month. The landlord then sued the tenant for
breach of the lease.
18. 647 S.W.2d at 331.
19. Id. at 338.
20. Id. at 335.
21. Id. The court did not discuss the effect that evidence pertaining to the amount of
the parking area that the tenant would recover upon the completion of the theater would
have had upon the outcome of the present case.
22. 323 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1959, writ ref d n.r.e.) (nine-month in-
terference with tenant's use of leased premises during six-year lease constituted permanent
deprivation).
23. 647 S.W.2d at 335.
24. Id.
25. 644 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
26. Id. at 184. The lease provided: "No waiver by the parties hereto of any default or
breach of any term, condition or covenant of this lease shall be deemed to be a waiver of any
subsequent default or breach of the same or any other term, condition or covenant contained
herein." Id.
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In court the tenant contended that the landlord's prior acceptance of late
rental payments established a custom and course of dealing whereby the
landlord waived the right to declare a default upon the tenant's subsequent
failure to timely pay rental installments. Although the landlord conceded
that he could waive his right to declare a default for delinquent rental
installments by the continuous acceptance of late payments, 27 the landlord
argued that such a waiver cannot occur when the lease contains an express
provision against such a waiver. The court of appeals, citing authority
from other jurisdictions, held that the express provision in the lease consti-
tuted a valid contract preventing the occurrence of waiver of late payments
through a custom and course of dealing of accepting rental installments. 28
D. Option to Purchase
In Blaschke v. Wiede29 the Texarkana court of appeals considered
whether, in the absence of a provision indicating a contrary intent, the
holdover of a tenant extends a purchase option contained in the lease be-
yond its original term. The landlord and tenant in Blaschke executed a
one-year lease, that contained provisions granting the tenant an option to
purchase the leased premises. 30 The lease did not provide for renewal of
either the lease or the purchase provision. The tenant held over under the
lease for a number of years. The landlord ultimately sued the tenant to
remove the cloud on title that the purchase provisions created, and the
tenant counterclaimed, seeking specific performance of the purchase
provisions.
The court found that the purchase provisions constituted an option to
purchase and, citing prior Texas authority, held that a holdover does not
27. Id. (citing Wendlandt v. Sommers Drug Stores Co., 551 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Fant v. Miller, 218 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1949, writ refd n.r.e.)).
28. 644 S.W.2d at 184 (citing 650 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 95
F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 567 (1938); King v. Petroleum Servs. Corp.,
536 P.2d 116, 119 (Alaska 1975); Cottonwood Plaza Assocs. v. Nordale, 132 Ariz. 228, 644
P.2d 1314, 1318-19 (Ct. App. 1982); Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 33, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 335, 340 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Philpot v. Bouchelle, 411 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
29. 649 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
30. The purchase provisions stated:
3. the lessors have agreed to sell and do by these present agree to sell to
the lessee the said land at a total consideration of Fourteen Thousand Dollars
($14,000.00), provided that they can make and deliver good title thereto.
4. In the event that such sale is consummated, the annual rental herein
and heretofore paid shall be applied as a part of the sales price of said prop-
erty and shall be deducted from the total cash payment required of the pur-
chaser. Should the lessors enable themselves to make good title to said
property, they hereby agree to convey the same by warranty deed to lessee
herein, upon his payment, including these payments, the sum of Three Thou-
sand Dollars ($3,000.00) or more, and his delivery to them of his vendor's lien
note for the balance, with interest at 4-1/2, payable Six Hundred Dollars
($600.00) per year, but the maker of said note shall have the option to repay
said note by increasing said payments, or by additional payments.
Id. at 750.
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extend a purchase option beyond the original term of the lease unless a
contrary intent appears from the lease as a whole. 3' Since neither party
presented evidence indicating that the parties intended to extend the
purchase option beyond the original one-year term of the lease, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant specific performance of
the purchase provisions.32 The court also affirmed the lower court's award
of the land to the landlord and thereby removed the cloud on the land-
lord's title.33
E. Rental Information Service
In United Home Rentals, Inc. v. Texas Real Estate Commission34 a fed-
eral district court in Texas considered whether the Texas Real Estate Li-
cense Act 35 applies to a rental information service. United Home, a rental
information service, compiled, catalogued, and sold information concern-
ing available rental properties to people who purchased a membership for
a specified fee. 36 According to the Texas Real Estate Commission, the
functions performed by the United Home employees could only be per-
formed by persons licensed under the Texas Real Estate License Act. 37
The Commission rejected the license applications of three United Home
employees on the ground that they had misrepresented their activities on
their license applications. 38 The Commission also instituted administra-
tive proceedings to revoke the licenses of an employee, a director, and the
sole shareholder of United Home on the basis of their associations with
unlicensed persons.39
United Home, an employee, and its sole shareholder filed suit40 against
31. Id. (citing Kruegel v. Berry, 75 Tex. 230, 9 S.W. 863 (1888); Thermo Prods. Co. v.
Chilton Indep. School Dist., 647 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
32. 649 S.W.2d at 750.
33. Id.
34. 548 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
35. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
36. United Home provided the following types of services to its members: (1) The gath-
ering of rental information from landlords, classified advertisements, and other sources;(2) periodic certification as to the accuracy of the information regarding catalogued property
and its continued availability for rental; (3) handling incoming telephone calls in response to
advertisements and conveying information to members concerning newly catalogued rental
properties; and (4) explaining the company's services and the sale of policies to customers
who visited the office. Id. at 568.
37. Id.; see TEX REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
38. The license application required an applicant to affirm under oath that he had not
previously performed activities requiring a license. 548 F. Supp. at 568. Because the United
Home employees had previously performed restricted activities, the Commission rejected
their applications. The Commission stated that it was "not satisfied that [the United Home
employees] would conduct [their] real estate business with honesty, trustworthiness and in-
tegrity as required by . . . [the Act]." Id. at 569.
39. Section 15(4)(F) of the Texas Real Estate License Act permits the Commission to
suspend or revoke a license when the licensee has been guilty of "paying a commission or
fees to or dividing a commission or fees with anyone not licensed as a real estate broker or
salesman in this state or in any other state . . . for compensation for services as a real estate
agent." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 15(4)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
40. United Home filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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the Commission, claiming that the Commission violated their first and
fourteenth amendment right to freedom of speech.4 ' The court concluded
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission4 2 governed the case.43 The
Court in Central Hudson established a test for deciding commercial speech
cases which was comprised of four components: First, whether the speech
in question is protected by the first amendment; second, whether the gov-
ernmental interest asserted as a basis for regulating the speech is substan-
tial; third, whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest; and fourth, whether the regulation is more extensive than neces-
sary to serve that interest.44
Comparing the information provided by United Home to classified ad-
vertising in a newspaper, the court held that the first amendment protects
dissemination of the type of information United Home provided.45 Al-
though the court found that the consumer protection interest asserted by
the government was substantial and that the Texas Real Estate License Act
directly advanced the interest asserted, the court held that the regulation
attempted by the Commission was more extensive than necessary.46 In
reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished between the services pro-
vided by apartment locator services and the services provided by United
Home. The court indicated that the imposition of licensing requirements
upon apartment locator services would be constitutional because knowl-
edge of real estate law, marketing, and management is necessary to per-
form such service adequately. The court found that the services United
Home provided constituted exchanges of information that did not involve
or require knowledge of real estate law, marketing, or management. The
court concluded that information provided by rental information services,
such as United Home, is commercial speech protected by the first amend-
ment.47 The court therefore held that the Texas Real Estate License Act
impermissibly restricted United Home's freedom of speech. 48
F Security Deposits
In Kramek v. Stewart49 the San Antonio court of appeals considered
whether the commencement of litigation by a tenant to recover his security
deposit prior to the expiration of the thirty-day statutory period, during
which a landlord may return a security deposit without being presumed to
have acted in bad faith, 50 precludes recovery of statutory penalties and
41. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
42. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
43. 548 F. Supp. at 571.
44. 447 U.S. at 566.
45. 548 F. Supp. at 571.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Id. at 575.
48. Id.
49. 648 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
50. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.109(c)-(d) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified
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attorneys' fees by the tenant.5 1 The tenant in Kramek mailed his forward-
ing address to his former landlord on September 11, 1980.52 The tenant
filed suit to recover the tenant's security deposit on October 7, 1980, prior
to the expiration of the statutory thirty-day period. The court held that the
premature filing of the suit limited the tenant's recovery to return of the
security deposit with no award for penalties or attorneys' fees. 53
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4(c) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1982-1983)). Section
92.109(c)-(d) provides:
(c) In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord
has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security
deposit was reasonable.
(d) A landlord who fails either to return a security deposit or to provide a
written description and itemization of deductions on or before the 30th day
after the date the tenant surrenders possession is presumed to have acted in
bad faith.
Id.
51. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.109(a)-(b) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (formerly codified
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 4(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)). Section
92.109(a)-(b) provides:
(a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of
this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times
the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable
attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit.
(b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written description and
itemized list of damages and charges in violation of this subchapter:
(1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security de-
posit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises;
and
(2) is liable for the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to
recover the security deposit.
Id.
52. The thirty-day period during which a landlord may refund a security deposit before
the court presumes that the landlord has acted in bad faith does not commence until the
tenant has furnished the landlord with the tenant's forwarding address for the purposes of
security deposit refunding. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.107(a) (Vernon Pam. 1983) (for-
merly codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)).
53. 648 S.W.2d at 402.
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